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| Clementi, Gian Luca; Cooley, Thomas. |
| In this paper we describe the important features of executive compensation in the US from 1993 to 2006. Some confirm what has been found for earlier periods and some are novel. Notable facts are that: the compensation distribution is highly skewed; each year, a sizeable fraction of chief executives lose money; the use of security grants has increased over time; the income accruing to CEOs from the sale of stock increased; regardless of the measure we adopt, compensation responds strongly to innovations in shareholder wealth; measured as dollar changes in compensation, incentives have strengthened over time, measured as percentage changes in wealth, they have not changed in any appreciable way. |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: CEO; Pay–Performance Sensitivity; Stock; Options; Financial Economics; G34; J33; M52. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/92834 |
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| Gius, Mark P.. |
| The present study uses the latest data available from ExecuComp in order to estimate an economic model of the determinants of CEO compensation. Examining 975 CEO’s over the period 1992-2002, the present study finds that experience had a positive effect on CEO pay, while industry specific dummy variables had little, if any, effect on compensation. Performance measures, such as net income per sales and return on equity, had very little effect on CEO pay. The results of the present study corroborate many anecdotal assertions that CEO pay is not linked to firm performance. However, the results of the present study indicate that experience is one of the most important factors affecting CEO compensation. Gender was not found to play a significant role; however,... |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: CEO; Compensation; Financial Economics; J33. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/50158 |
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